Valuing Community Property Businesses: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Louisiana Law by Richardson, Sally Brown
Louisiana Law Review 
Volume 80 
Number 3 Spring 2020 Article 9 
9-15-2020 
Valuing Community Property Businesses: The Good, the Bad, and 
the Ugly of Louisiana Law 
Sally Brown Richardson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev 
 Part of the Family Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Sally Brown Richardson, Valuing Community Property Businesses: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of 
Louisiana Law, 80 La. L. Rev. (2020) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol80/iss3/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu. 






    
    
  
   
     
    
  
    





   
 
   
    
 
   
  
   
  
       
      
      
     
   
Valuing Community Property Businesses: The Good, 
the Bad, and the Ugly of Louisiana Law
Sally Brown Richardson* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .................................................................................. 809
I. The Good: A Battle Based on Facts ............................................. 811
II. The Beginning of the Bad: Ellington, Goodwill,
and “Personal Qualities” .............................................................. 818
III. The Ugly: Taking Stated Value at Face Value............................. 825
IV. Unraveling the Wrongness of Rao ............................................... 831
V. Getting Back to the Good: How Courts Should 
Value the Community’s Interest in a Business ............................ 838
Conclusion.................................................................................... 845
INTRODUCTION
Valuing community assets must occur during any partition of the
community, yet few legislative or scholarly sources provide guidance for
how that valuation should be done in Louisiana.1 The pertinent statute on 
Copyright 2020, by SALLY BROWN RICHARDSON.
* A.D. Freeman Associate Professor of Civil Law, Tulane University Law
School. Earlier drafts of this Article have been presented at the Family Law
Seminar at the Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, and during 
a Faculty Workshop at Tulane University Law School. The author thanks all
participants for their helpful input. The author also thanks Lila Tritico Hogan, 
Ann Lipton, and Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., for their helpful discussions on prior drafts.
All views and any errors herein are solely attributable to the author.
1. For discussions on valuing community property in Louisiana, see
ANDREA CARROLL & RICHARD D. MORENO, MATRIMONIAL REGIMES § 7:27, in 
16 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 761–76 (4th ed. 2013) [hereinafter
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES]; ROBERT C. LOWE, LOUISIANA DIVORCE § 9:123, in 2 
LOUISIANA PRACTICE SERIES 199–02 (2019) [hereinafter LOUISIANA DIVORCE];
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810 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
the topic of partition simply states that parties to a divorce must provide a
detailed descriptive list that includes, among other things, all of the
community property and the “fair market value” of that community
property.2 The other party to the divorce then has a chance to “traverse or
concur” in those valuations,3 but ultimately the court must “value the
[community property] assets”4 and determine the “fair market value” of 
each asset.5 As the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal aptly
observed in the infamous 2003 case Ellington v. Ellington, “the law
provides no mathematical formula for determining the value of
community assets.”6 
Although legislation gives no exact roadmap for how to value 
community property, Louisiana courts over the past two decades have
provided an increasing number of examples of what not to do in the
context of valuing the community’s interest in a business.7 Following the
Ellington decision and the legislation that spawned from that decision,8 
courts have increasingly taken the position that the community’s interest
in a business is automatically valued at the buy-sell amount stated in the 
agreement that initially established the community’s interest in that 
business.9 Such results, as asserted herein, are a misreading of the
statutorily provided valuation requirement in a community property 
partition and have the potential effect of mis-valuing the community’s 
interest in a business to the detriment or benefit of the spouse who is not 
ultimately assigned the asset. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. First, the Article explores how
courts determined community property business valuations prior to
Ellington v. Ellington. Second, the Article explains how the Ellington 
case—a case concerning the valuation of goodwill in a community 
Kenneth Rigby, Matrimonial Regimes: Recent Developments, 67 LA. L. REV. 73,
98–108 (2006).
2. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2801(A)(1)(a) (2018).
3. Id. § 9:2801(A)(2).
4. Id. § 9:2801(A)(4)(a).
5. Id. § 9:2801(A)(1)(a).
6. Ellington v. Ellington, 842 So. 2d 1160, 1166 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2003);
see also Head v. Head, 714 So. 2d 231, 234 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1998) (“Business
valuations methods are not an exact science . . . .”).
7. Infra Part III.
8. Infra Part II.
9. Bulloch v. Bulloch, 214 So. 3d 930, 940–41 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017);
Rao v. Rao, 927 So. 2d 356, 366 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2005); Baumbouree v.
Baumbouree, 202 So. 3d 1077, 1084 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2016); see also infra 
Part III (discussing the decisions in Rao, Baumbouree, and Bulloch).
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8112020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
property business—served as the unintentional catalyst for courts to 
dramatically alter how they more generally determined the fair market
value of a community property business. Third, the Article details the three
recent Louisiana cases that follow this newly utilized method of valuing
the community’s interest in a community property business. Fourth, the
Article details the fallacy of the logic used in these recent cases. And fifth,
the Article explains how courts should approach valuing the community’s 
interest in a business going forward. 
I. THE GOOD: A BATTLE BASED ON FACTS
Valuing community businesses is tough.10 For decades, Louisiana
courts correctly allowed valuation of community businesses to be a battle
of the experts based on actual facts.11 
Historically, Louisiana trial courts relied on experts in determining the 
value of community businesses.12 Experts utilized a variety of respected 
accounting techniques to value community businesses, such as:
(1) proffering the book value of the business or its economic net worth;
(2) using a capitalization of earnings method; (3) employing a
capitalization of cash flow method; or (4) utilizing a price earnings ratio
method.13 In reading different experts’ reports and taking their testimony,
10. See J. THOMAS OLDHAM, TEXAS MARITAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 271
(Carolina Academic Press 5th ed. 2011); MATRIMONIAL REGIMES, supra note 1,
at 765 (noting courts must be careful to value the community’s interest, not just
the assets of the business); 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 426 (2019).
11. E.g., Schiro v. Schiro, 839 So. 2d 304, 307–09 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 
2003); Moody v. Moody, 622 So. 2d 1381, 1383–84 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1993);
Head, 714 So. 2d at 232. Encouraging a battle of the experts in any litigation may
be met with the objection that experts are costly. It goes without saying that
experts are expensive, see FRANK L. MARAIST, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9.1, in 1 
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 276 (2d ed. 2008), and, in some cases, the value
of the community’s interest in a business may not warrant the hiring of an expert.
As noted in many of the cases herein, however, the community’s interest in a
business may well exceed $1,000,000. In such cases, it is certainly wise to engage 
accountants or business valuation experts because their cost, while possibly high,
will pale in comparison to the potential amount acquired by the client. 
12. E.g., Chance v. Chance, 694 So. 2d 613 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997); Head,
714 So. 2d at 232; McDonald v. McDonald, 909 So. 2d 694, 699 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
Cir. 2005); Preis v. Preis, 649 So. 2d 593, 594–95 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
13. E.g., Moody, 622 So. 2d at 1383 (both experts used all five techniques to 
determine the value of the community business). See also Preis, 649 So. 3d at 595 
(accepting a net income approach); Trahan v. Trahan, 43 So. 3d 218, 229 (La. Ct.
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  156 8/17/20  7:19 AM

















     





     




   
   
     
  
  
   
 
    
 
    
 







812 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
courts regularly relied on experts’ opinions,14 found fault with experts 
when their opinions failed to take into account pertinent information,15 and
sometimes even averaged differing experts’ valuations when it seemed
reasonable.16 In doing so, trial courts performed their function of assessing 
the credibility of the experts and weighing the experts’ testimony based on
App. 1st Cir. 2010) (accepting a discounted cash flow method); Schiro, 839 So. 
2d at 308 (using a capitalized excess earnings method). 
14. E.g., Statham v. Statham, 986 So. 2d 894, 898 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2008)
(relying on the husband’s expert); Landry v. Simon, 732 So. 2d 587, 589 (La. Ct. 
App. 3d Cir. 1999) (relying on the husband’s expert); Head, 714 So. 2d 231 
(accepting valuations from both husband’s and wife’s experts for different
community assets).
15. E.g., Guillaume v. Guillaume, 603 So. 2d 235, 238 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1992) (finding fault with an expert opinion as based on “speculation and
assumption”); Statham, 986 So. 2d at 897–98 (rejecting the wife’s expert, in part,
because the data used was two years old); Ellington v. Ellington, 842 So. 2d 1160, 
1165 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2003) (using the wife’s expert’s methodology, but
finding that more years of data had to be incorporated into the valuation).
16. E.g., McDonald, 909 So. 2d at 699; Schiro, 839 So. 2d at 309; see also 
Drennan v. Drennan, 121 So. 3d 177, 187 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2013) (trial court
averaged the experts’ valuations in an attempt to find the “equitable fair market 
value,” but the appellate court rejected the trial court’s valuations because it took
into account a valuation that used the wrong valuation date). It is worth noting
that averaging experts’ opinions on the subject of valuation may not actually result
in obtaining the fair market value of the business. See MATRIMONIAL REGIMES,
supra note 1, at 1 (Supp. 2018 at 97) (discussing the divided jurisprudence on 
averaging expert opinions and the propriety of courts averaging experts’
valuations). In a recent case in Kentucky involving the valuation of a business
created while married, the Kentucky Supreme Court forcefully struck down the
idea that a lower court could simply average different experts’ valuations to reach 
the fair market value of the business for purposes of equitable distribution at 
divorce. See Gaskill v. Robbins, 282 S.W.3d 306, 315 (Ky. 2009). The Kentucky 
court stated that:
Using an average to obtain a value, without some basis other than an 
inability to choose between conflicting and competing valuation 
methods, is nothing more than making up a number, for there is no 
evidentiary basis to support that specific number. Employing all four
methods, then averaging them, is tantamount to no method at all. If an 
expert believes four methods are valid, yet each produces a different 
number, this provides little or no help to the trial court. The trial court
must fix a value, and there should be an evidence-based articulation for
why that is the value used. While an average may present the easiest
route, it lacks the proper indicia of reliability.
Id. 
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  157 8/17/20  7:19 AM







   
   











    
  
   
 
 
     
  
  
    
 
 
     
    
 
     
    
       
  
     
     
   
   
    
    
   
8132020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
their professional qualifications and experience.17 Appellate courts, in 
turn, did not disturb the findings of trial courts absent manifest error.18 
Regardless of the ultimate accounting method or methods on which a 
court relied, Louisiana courts attempted to discern the value of the actual
business interest, as opposed to merely valuing the assets of the business
entity.19 By doing so, courts sought to determine to the best of their ability
the “fair market value” of the community’s interest in the business, as
required under Louisiana legislation concerning the partition of
community property.20 
In discerning the fair market value of the community’s interest in a
business, courts did not simply accept the values stated in the partnership 
or shareholder agreements at face value, but instead engaged in a detailed
analysis of the actual fair market value of the community business.21 For 
example, in Borrello v. Borrello, the husband was a member of a large law 
partnership.22 During the spouses’ divorce, the husband asserted that the
valuation of his interest, and thus the community’s interest, in the
partnership was set by the partnership agreement, and his wife was bound 
to use that stated amount for purposes of partitioning the community 
property.23 The Borrello court disagreed.24 The court held that the wife
was “permitted to discover information necessary for her to establish the
value of her husband’s partnership interest.”25 In doing so, the court
expressly recognized that the fair market value of the community’s interest
17. See Head, 714 So. 2d at 234; Statham, 986 So. 2d at 900; Alford v. Alford, 
653 So. 2d 133, 136–37 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting the husband’s 
expert based on credibility); see also Henry v. Henry, No. 2017-CA-0282, 2017 
WL 4700385 *3 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2017) (remanding a case to the trial court
so that the trial court could “consider the credibility of the expert’s findings before 
rejecting the expert’s opinion”).
18. Drennan, 121 So. 3d at 181; Gill v. Gill, 895 So. 2d 807, 813 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 2005); Landry, 732 So. 2d at 589; Schiro, 839 So. 2d at 305; Statham,
986 So. 2d at 900.
19. McDonald, 909 So. 2d at 698; Waguespack v. Waguespack, 2010 WL
3291815, *3 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010); Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1166.
20. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2801(A)(2) (2019) (establishing that “fair market 
value” is the value to be assigned to all community assets during a partition).
21. E.g., Borrello v. Borrello, 614 So. 2d 91, 92 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1992);
Moody v. Moody, 622 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1993); D’Spain
v. D’Spain, 527 So. 2d 309, 315 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1988).
22. Borrello, 614 So. 2d at 92.
23. Id. at 94.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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814 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
in the husband’s law partnership may be different than the amount set forth 
in the partnership agreement.26 
Similarly, in Fastabend v. Fastabend, the husband acquired an interest
in a medical partnership while married.27 The partnership agreement that the
husband had signed declared that no partner had an interest in or a claim to
the accounts receivable of the medical partnership.28 When the husband and
his wife divorced, the court had to value the community’s interest in the 
medical partnership.29 In calculating the value of the medical partnership,
the trial court included the partnership’s accounts receivable.30 The husband
objected to their inclusion, arguing that he had no claim to the accounts
receivable under the terms of the partnership agreement.31 
The appellate court in Fastabend disagreed with the husband.32 The 
court stated that although the husband individually had no direct claim to
the accounts receivable, it was “undisputed that the accounts receivable 
[were] an asset of the partnership itself. As such they must be used in
calculating the value of the partnership. . . . It is the value of the partnership
which forms the basis for the determination of [the husband’s] interest in
it.”33 Accordingly, the Fastabend court held that while the partnership
agreement provided a means to calculate the husband’s interest in the
partnership, that calculation method was not inherently binding on the wife 
for purposes of valuing the husband’s interest at divorce.
In refusing to take the stated value at face value, courts sometimes
found that the amount stated in a business agreement inflated the
business’s actual value. For example, in Moody v. Moody, the court had to
value the community’s interest in a community property corporation run 
by the husband.34 The husband’s expert at trial averaged the book value,
economic net worth, capitalization of earnings, capitalization of cash flow, 
and price earnings ratio methods and asserted that the value of each share
held by the community in the corporation was $2.49.35 The wife’s expert 
utilized the same five methods of valuing the company, but her expert
26. Id.
27. Fastabend v. Fastabend, 606 So. 2d 794, 798 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.), writ







34. Moody v. Moody, 622 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
35. Id.
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8152020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
concluded that the actual value of the shares was higher at $3.47 per
share.36 
In rejecting the opinions of both experts, the trial court determined the
value of the community’s shares in the corporation to be $5.45 per share 
because the husband, as the president of the corporation, set the price per 
share at $5.45 mere weeks prior to the termination of the community.37 
The trial court found that because the husband had the “power and
authority and the sole discretion” to sell the stock, the husband should be
bound by the value he helped set for the stock.38 
The appellate court in Moody overturned the trial court and found that 
the wife’s expert’s valuation represented the net economic worth of the
corporation.39 In rejecting the share value of $5.45 that was established 
with the husband’s help in a Board of Directors meeting, the appellate 
court noted that it was evident that the $5.45 stock value “was not an
attempt to determine the true fair market value of the corporation at that
time. It was more in the nature of a compromise wherein the corporation 
agreed to pay $5.45 for the repurchase of a small amount of corporate stock
from an employee.”40 
By rejecting the stated share value, the Moody court affirmed the 
statutory requirement that the value of a community’s interest in any
community asset, including the community’s interest in a business, is the 
actual fair market value of the asset,41 which may or may not be the
amount stated in any particular agreement. In finding the fair market value
of the community’s interest in the corporation, the Moody court recognized
that a business may take into account a number of factors when assigning 
itself a value,42 which inherently means that any amount a business assigns
itself or establishes to buy out its members may or may not reflect the 
actual fair market value of that business.43 
36. Id. at 1384.
37. Id. at 1383. 
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1384. 
40. Id. at 1385.
41. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2801(A)(1)(a) (2019).
42. Moody, 622 So. 2d at 1384.
43. Numerous other courts outside of Louisiana have expressly recognized in 
the context of divorce cases that the value stated in a business agreement is not 
inherently the fair market value of that business. See, e.g., Bosserman v. 
Bosserman, 384 S.E.2d 104, 108 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (“The price established for
buy-out purposes, however, is often artificial and does not always reflect true
value.”); Bettinger v. Bettinger, 396 S.E.2d 709, 715 (W. Va. 1990) (“It is
apparent that buy-sell agreements in a closely held corporation can be
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  160 8/17/20  7:19 AM





   
   
    
 
  
   
   
  
 
   
     
  










   
  
  





    
   
   
    
  
    
   
   
   
   
816 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
In determining the true fair market value of a community’s interest in 
a business, courts historically engaged in an analysis based on the actual 
facts pertaining to the divorcing couple, as opposed to alternative realities 
proposed by an individual spouse. For example, in Head v. Head, the
husband purchased an interest in a family owned corporation while
married.44 The husband served as the principal officer for the
corporation.45 Upon divorce, the husband and wife each hired appraisers 
as their experts, and both appraisers used the capitalization of normalized
earnings method to value the community’s interest.46 The experts disputed
whether the value of the corporation should be discounted for a lack of
marketability.47 The husband’s expert noted that the capitalization method 
used to value the corporation was for valuing interests in a publicly traded
business, but the family owned corporation at issue was a privately held 
business.48 Because privately held businesses are harder to sell on the open 
market, the husband’s expert asserted that the value of privately held 
businesses is generally discounted when using a capitalization of
normalized earnings method.49 Accordingly, the husband’s expert said the
value of the family owned corporation in the case should be similarly
discounted.50 
The Head court disagreed. The court noted that the husband intended
to continue running the business.51 As the court stated, “Where a sale of
the business to a third party is not contemplated, the value of the stock
manipulated by the shareholders to reflect an artificially low value. This is why 
caution should be exercised in accepting their value for equitable distribution 
purposes.”); Rogers v. Rogers, 296 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Minn. 1980) (noting that
the court did not have to accept the buy-sell amount as dispositive of the husband’s
interest in a closely-held S corporation for purposes of valuing the husband’s
shares at divorce). See generally Stevens A. Carey, Buy/Sell Provisions in Real
Estate Joint Venture Agreements, 39 REAL PPTJ 651 (2005) (discussing how buy-
sell amounts may be valued for different purposes and are not necessarily set at
the market rate); Eric A. Manterfield, Buy-Sell Agreements, ST002 ALI-ABA 59,
87–90 (2011) (noting the different methods of setting a buy-sell amount, not all 
of which equate the buy-sell amount with the fair market value of the entity).
44. Head v. Head, 714 So. 2d 231, 232 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1998).
45. Id.
46. Id. Although the experts both agreed on the method of valuation, they 
disputed the value of perks to be added back to the net cash flow, which is required
when using the capitalization of earnings method. Id. at 235.
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8172020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
should be determined without discounting for lack of marketability.”52 In
reaching this conclusion, the Head court recognized that if a closely held 
corporation is not going to be placed on the open market, courts do not
need to discount the corporation’s value as if the corporation were being 
sold on the open market. In other words, in determining the fair market
value of the community’s interest in the corporation, the Head court
implicitly rejected applying a series of hypothetical facts that the court
knew would not occur. 
Similarly, in Segura v. Comeaux, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of 
Appeal found that courts should not take into account pure speculations
on the part of one party in valuing a community business.53 In Segura, the
husband and wife created a business while married.54 The wife ran the
company and, upon filing for divorce, fired the husband from the 
business.55 In determining the value of the community business, the wife
asserted that the court should take into account the possibility of a state
sales tax audit.56 The Segura court disagreed, stating that the possibility of
a tax audit was purely “speculative” and that while everyone agreed such
an audit was possible, “no notice of any action by the state had been 
given.”57 Thus, the Segura court found that mere speculations should not
be factored into the fair market valuation of the community business.58 
What all of the aforementioned cases highlight is the effort by
Louisiana courts to determine the actual fair market value of a community 
business interest when partitioning community property. In doing so, 
52. Id.; see also McGehee v. McGehee, 543 So. 2d 1126, 1128–29 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 1989) (assigning a value to an insurance agency based on the
evidence that the husband did not intend to sell the agency and the wife did not 
intend to compete with the agency in the future); Nesbitt v. Nesbitt, 15 So. 3d 
1229, 1232 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2009) (finding that the trial court did not err in
not applying a “marketability” approach to valuing a law partnership when there 
was no evidence that there was a third party to whom the spouse–lawyer was
going to sell the law partnership). But see Thomson v. Thomson, 978 So. 2d 509, 
515 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008) (applying a minority-ownership discount even 
though a sale of the community’s minority-ownership interest was not being 
contemplated).
53. Segura v. Comeaux, 279 So. 3d 418, 421 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2017).
54. Id. at 419.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 419–20.
57. Id. at 421.
58. Id.; see Mexic v. Mexic, 577 So. 2d 1046, 1049–50 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1991) (“The value of the community interests in real estate partnerships should 
not and cannot be predicated on tax consequences of some future uncertain 
event.”).
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818 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
courts routinely rejected the notion that the value stated in a partnership or
shareholder agreement was automatically the fair market value of the
community business. Instead, courts engaged in detailed accounting 
analysis to determine the fair market value, as statutorily required under
Louisiana law.
II. THE BEGINNING OF THE BAD: ELLINGTON, GOODWILL, AND 
“PERSONAL QUALITIES”
Trying to find the fair market value of the actual business interest, as
opposed to just the value of the assets of the business, is inextricably linked
to goodwill—specifically the goodwill of the spouse working at the
business.59 Goodwill is notoriously difficult to value itself,60 and it has
unsurprisingly added a level of complication to valuing community 
businesses in Louisiana. 
Although courts prior to 1900 noted in dicta that goodwill could be 
part of a community business,61 the first modern case that wrestled with 
this concept for purposes of partition at divorce was Depner v. Depner.62 
In Depner, a husband created a medical corporation prior to marriage.63 At 
the termination of the marriage, the court had to determine how much the
separate property medical corporation had increased in value during the
59. DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETT, ACCOUNTING FOR 
LAWYERS 571 (Foundation Press 4th ed. 2006) (noting that goodwill is an asset of 
a business and difficult to value); JOHN TINGLEY & NICHOLAS B. SVALINA,
MARITAL PROPERTY LAW § 43:7 (Thomson Reuters 2d ed. 2013).
60. See Helga White, Professional Goodwill: Is It a Settled Question or Is
There “Value” In Discussing It?, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 495, 497–501 
(1998) (discussing the difficulty in simply defining goodwill); Christopher A.
Tiso, Present Positions on Professional Goodwill: More Focus or Simply More 
Hocus Pocus?, 20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 51, 55–56 (2006) (noting that
although goodwill is difficult to value, such valuations are regularly done outside
of divorce).
61. E.g., Mehnert v. Dietrich, 36 La. Ann. 390, 391–92 (La. 1884) (finding
the goodwill of a business to be part of the community); Succession of 
Blancand, 19 So. 683, 684 (La. 1896) (noting that if there was goodwill in 
the community grocery business, it passed to the wife upon the husband’s
death along with the business); see also Eve Barrier Masinter, Professional 
Goodwill in Louisiana: An Analysis of Its Classification, Valuation and 
Partition, 43 LA. L. REV. 119 (1982) (discussing how Louisiana courts
should value professional goodwill).
62. See Depner v. Depner, 478 So. 2d 532, 533 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
63. Id. at 532.
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8192020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
course of the marriage.64 At dispute was whether any increase in the
goodwill of the medical corporation should be included in the 
corporation’s value.65 
In its analysis, the Depner court provided the definition of goodwill 
that remains in use today.66 Louisiana courts, in the context of community 
property partitions, consider goodwill to be “the chance or probability that
custom will be had at a certain place of business in consequence of the
way that business has been conducted,”67 or put more simply, “the
probability that the customers of the old establishment will continue their
patronage.”68 
Using this definition, the Depner court found that the likelihood that
patients would return to the medical corporation in which the husband had
an interest was not an asset of the corporation, but instead part of the
husband himself.69 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that:
The good will in which [the wife] seeks to share is the professional
competence, as perceived by [the husband’s] patients, with which
her husband has practiced his art. Professional medical competence 
is personal to the physician and cannot be attributed to the
corporation because it is a personal relationship between physician
and patient, not between the corporation and patient.70 
By making this distinction between goodwill held by the individual and
goodwill held by a business, Depner began a division that Louisiana courts
followed until 2003.
Subsequent courts interpreted Depner to establish a division between 
goodwill attributable to a professional business, such as a medical practice
or a legal partnership, and goodwill attributable to a commercial business,
such as an oil company or a cotton exchange.71 Courts found that goodwill
64. Id.
65. Id. at 534.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 534; see also Head v. Head, 714 So. 2d 231, 236 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 1998); LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 694 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
1997).
68. Godwin v. Godwin, 533 So. 2d 1009, 1010 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1988) 
(citing Ballero v. Heslin, 128 So. 2d 453, 455 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1961), and 
noting that Depner cited Ballero affirmatively); Landry v. Simon, 732 So. 2d 587,
588 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1999). 
69. Depner, 478 So. 2d at 533–34.
70. Id. at 534.
71. See, e.g., Landry, 732 So. 2d at 588 (noting the division between goodwill
in professional businesses and goodwill in commercial businesses); Preis v. Preis, 
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820 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
in the former was not a community asset but part and parcel of the
professional spouse, whereas goodwill in the latter did constitute a 
community asset because it was an actual asset of the commercial
business.72 
For example, in Preis v. Preis, the community had an interest in a law
corporation due to the attorney–husband.73 In valuing the law corporation,
the wife’s expert sought to value the assets of the corporation as including
its goodwill, while the husband’s expert sought to value the percentage of
net income that the husband historically received from the law
corporation.74 The court found nothing “manifestly wrong” with using the
husband’s expert’s valuation and refused to consider the husband’s 
goodwill as part of the valuation of the law corporation.75 The Preis court
stated that:
Louisiana has made the distinction between goodwill which 
attaches to the person because of the person’s unique qualities, 
and goodwill which attaches to the business because of the nature
of the business. . . . The accounts of a commercial business can be
sold for a price in the open market regardless of who operates the 
business. Clients of a law firm choose that firm based on its 
members and qualifications. Without its attorneys, a law firm has
no separate goodwill.76 
The Preis court, like the Depner court before, established that in the 
context of professional businesses, like a law practice, goodwill should not 
be included in the business valuation given that any goodwill was 
inextricably linked to the individual spouse. 
649 So. 2d 593, 596 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994); see also MATRIMONIAL REGIMES,
supra note 1, at 52–55; Kelly M. Haggar, A Catalyst in the Cotton: The Proper
Allocation of the “Goodwill” of Closely Held Businesses and Professional
Practices in Dissolution of Marriages, 65 LA. L. REV. 1191, 1245–46 (noting that
prior to Ellington, goodwill in a commercial business was classified as a 
community asset).
72. E.g., Collier v. Collier, 790 So. 2d 759, 762 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2001)
(noting that “goodwill may be included in the value of a commercial
corporation”); LeBlanc, 694 So. 2d at 1173 (noting that courts had allowed 
goodwill to exist in commercial enterprises).
73. Preis, 649 So. 2d at 594.
74. Id. at 595.
75. Id. at 595–96.
76. Id. at 596.
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8212020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
On the flip side of cases like Preis and Depner is the infamous case
Ellington v. Ellington.77 Ellington involved the divorce of then-State
Senator Noble Ellington and his wife, Peggy.78 During their marriage,
Noble and Peggy worked for the community business they created, the 
Noble Ellington Cotton Company (“NECC”), a company that bought and
sold cotton.79 At the termination of the marriage, the Ellington court had 
to determine the value of NECC for the purpose of partitioning their 
community property.80 
Both Noble and Peggy hired experts on the issue of valuing NECC.
Peggy’s expert, a certified public accountant, asserted that the best method
of valuation was the capitalization of earnings method.81 Under the 
capitalization of earnings method, Peggy’s expert concluded that NECC
was worth $668,000 and that a substantial portion of that value was due to
the goodwill that Noble created.82 Noble’s expert, a certified valuation
expert, used a net asset method of valuing the community property
business.83 Under the net asset valuation—which did not take goodwill
into account—Noble’s expert stated that NECC had zero value because
the company’s liabilities exceeded its assets.84 
The trial court in Ellington found that given the nature of NECC, it
was more appropriate to use a method of valuing the business that took
goodwill into account because NECC was a commercial business, as
compared to a professional business like a law or medical partnership.85 
The trial court noted that the customer base acquired by NECC was largely
attributable to Noble86 and that none of the goodwill of NECC was 
attributable to Peggy.87 Noble’s suggestion, then, was to allocate NECC to
Peggy at a value of $0 and allow Peggy to run the business.88 As the court
stated, such an idea was preposterous because the business as owned by
Peggy would have no customers and no value, but the business owned and 
operated by Noble was “capable of generating handsome incomes.”89 As 
77. Ellington v. Ellington, 842 So. 2d 1160 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2003).




82. Id. at 1163–64.
83. Id. at 1164.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1169–70.
86. Id. at 1169.
87. Id. at 1168.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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822 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
such, the trial court found it was appropriate to take Noble’s goodwill into 
account because NECC was a commercial business, and the court
allocated NECC to Noble in the partition.90 Accordingly, the trial court 
used the income approach that Peggy’s expert suggested.
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that “the law provides no 
mathematical formula for determining the value of community assets.”91 
The appellate court stated that “[i]f the trial court's valuations are
reasonably supported by the record and do not constitute an abuse of
discretion, its determinations should be affirmed.”92 In applying this
standard of review, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that the
business’s goodwill should be included in its valuation.93 Further, the
Second Circuit found no error in the trial court’s use of an income
approach to value the business.94 Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed 
the trial court’s decision in Ellington.95 
The Second Circuit released the Ellington decision on March 18, 2003.
The 2003 Regular Legislative Session of the Louisiana Legislature
convened on March 31 of the same year.96 In the 2003 Regular Legislative 
Session, Senator Noble Ellington proposed Senate Bill 844, which was
passed into law.97 Senator Ellington’s proposal created a new statute,
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2801.2, which established how community
property businesses should be valued during a partition of the community.
The statute stated:
In a proceeding to partition the community, the court may include,
in the valuation of a community commercial business, the 
goodwill of the business. Goodwill shall not be included in the
valuation of a business when goodwill results solely from the 
identity, reputation, or qualifications of the owner or from his
relationship with customers of the business.98 
90. Id. at 1168–71.
91. Id. at 1166.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1170.
94. Id. at 1171.
95. Id. at 1175.
96. See Senate Information Bulletin, 2003 Regular Session Date and Fact
Sheet, http://senate.legis.state.la.us/SessionInfo/Archives/2003/RS/LinkShell.asp?
Type=Bulletin.
97. Act No. 837, 2003 La. Acts 2696 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2801.2
(2018)).
98. Id.; see MATRIMONIAL REGIMES, supra note 1, at 57 (“Clearly, the thrust
of the new statute was to treat a business such as that in Ellington differently from
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8232020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
The statute as passed in 2003 was short-lived.99 Senator Ellington
proposed an amended version of the statute during the 2004 Regular 
Legislative Session.100 Act 177 was ultimately passed by the Louisiana
Legislature and signed into law, creating the version of Louisiana Revised 
Statutes § 9:2801.2 that remains in effect today:
In a proceeding to partition the community, the court may include,
in the valuation of any community owned corporate, commercial
or professional business, the goodwill of the business. However,
that portion of the goodwill attributable to any personal quality of
the spouse awarded the business shall not be included in the 
valuation of a business.101 
Following the passage of Act 177, courts were statutorily forced to
make a number of determinations in valuing the community’s interest in a 
business. First, in valuing a community property business, courts now had
to determine whether the business was a “corporate, commercial or
professional” business to which the new statute applied.102 Second, courts
must determine whether goodwill should be added to the valuation
because the statute permits goodwill to be added to the valuation of the 
business, but does not require that goodwill be added.103 Third, if goodwill
is to be added to the valuation of the business, then courts must determine
the amount of goodwill attributable to the “personal quality” of the spouse
who is to be awarded the business. This third step requires courts to
other commercial businesses and to treat these special commercial businesses 
equivalently to a professional practice.”).
99. See MATRIMONIAL REGIMES, supra note 1, at 57 (discussing the problems
with the original statute as enacted in 2003).
100. S.B. 146, 2004 Leg. Reg. Sess. (La. 2004).
101. Act No. 177, 2004 La. Acts 1161 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2801.2).
102. Some community property scholars have written that by including 
“corporate, commercial or professional” in Act 177, the legislature meant to
include all community property businesses. See MATRIMONIAL REGIMES, supra
note 1, at § 2.9. Although it may be difficult to conceive of a business that does 
not fall under the corporate, commercial, or professional rubric, the inclusion of
those descriptors certainly means that a court’s first order of business in applying 
the statute is to ensure that the community business is in fact corporate,
commercial, or professional in nature. 
103. Some courts have incorrectly read the plain meaning of the statute to
mean that goodwill must be applied. See McDonald v. McDonald, 909 So. 2d 694,
699 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2005) (“If the underlying business is community, the
goodwill should be and will be considered in dividing the community property as
part of the partition.”).
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824 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
simultaneously determine which spouse is to receive the business in the
partition because only the personal qualities of the spouse awarded the 
business must be omitted from the goodwill valuation.104 
Whereas before Ellington and its legislative offspring, courts 
discussed whether community property businesses were commercial or 
professional in nature, following the 2004 statute Louisiana courts’ 
discussions shifted to what constituted a “personal quality” of the spouse 
who acquired the business. For example, among the issues argued in 
Bulloch v. Bulloch was the extent to which the value of the community’s 
interest in a surgical clinic was attributable to the husband–physician’s 
personal goodwill or attributable to the clinic’s goodwill.105 The husband’s
expert valued the community’s share in the surgical clinic at $1,174,566
and stated that $730,649 of that interest was goodwill, with 30% of the
goodwill as attributable to the surgical clinic and 70% of the goodwill as
attributable to the personal qualities of the husband–physician.106 In
accepting the husband’s expert’s valuation, the Bulloch court discussed
the factors that showed goodwill was attributable to an individual doctor’s 
personal qualities.107 The Bulloch court stated that having a patient base 
dedicated to an individual physician was an example of goodwill based on
the personal qualities of that physician.108 
Cases like Bulloch are easily contrasted with cases like Amaraneni v.
Amaraneni.109 As in Bulloch, the husband in Amaraneni started a medical 
business during his marriage.110 The medical limited liability company 
104. In Rao v. Rao, the court erroneously held that not only should the
goodwill attributable to the personal qualities of the spouse awarded the business 
be subtracted from the business’s valuation, but that any goodwill attributable to
the personal qualities of other members of the business should be subtracted from 
the business’s valuation. Rao v. Rao, 927 So. 2d 356, 366 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 
2005). The plain text of the statute clearly provides that only the “portion of the
goodwill attributable to any personal quality of the spouse awarded the business” 
should be subtracted from the business’s valuation. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2801.2 
(2018) (emphasis added).
105. Bulloch v. Bulloch, 214 So. 3d 930, 937 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017). 
Bulloch is discussed in detail below. Infra Part III.
106. Bulloch, at 937.
107. Id.
108. Id. See also MATRIMONIAL REGIMES, supra note 1, at 55 (giving 
examples of personal qualities that create goodwill as an individual’s reputation, 
experience, or training, whether customers deal directly with the professional, and 
whether the corporate name is different than the individual professional).
109. Amaraneni v. Amaraneni, 2010 WL 502958 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010).
110. Id. at *1.
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8252020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
operated an urgent care facility.111 The husband asserted that the medical 
business had no value outside of goodwill attributable to his personal
qualities, but the court disagreed.112 The court found that the husband
rarely worked at the urgent care facility and, when he did, it was only as a 
regular shift physician.113 Patients were unable to call and make an 
appointment specifically with the husband–physician.114 Accordingly, the 
Amaraneni court found that any goodwill held by the LLC was not 
attributable to the husband’s personal qualities and thus should be included 
in the valuation of the business.115 
Since the Ellington decision and the passage of Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:2801.2, Louisiana courts have shifted the focus in valuing
goodwill in community businesses from whether the business is a
professional or commercial business to whether any goodwill generated
by the business is attributable to the personal qualities of the spouse who
is ultimately awarded the business. Ellington and its statutory progeny
have been discussed in Louisiana scholarship,116 and re-litigating their
merits is not the intent of this Article. The confusion created following 
Ellington, however, is important because it unintentionally served as the
catalyst for a trend in recent jurisprudence.
III. THE UGLY: TAKING STATED VALUE AT FACE VALUE
As courts have shifted their analysis regarding goodwill to whether
any goodwill generated by a community business is attributable to the 
personal qualities of the spouse who is awarded the business, courts have 
been increasingly concerned about how to calculate the value of a
community business without incidentally including goodwill. Of late,
courts have implied that if a shareholder agreement or partnership
agreement provides some buy-sell amount, values above and beyond that
amount must be attributable to goodwill.117 Because of the aforementioned 
goodwill statute, courts have assumed the stated buy-sell amount is the fair 
market value of the community business without any goodwill added.
In Rao v. Rao, a husband acquired an interest in a medical corporation
with five other physicians, with each physician acquiring a one-sixth 
111. Id. at *6.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at *7.
115. Id.
116. See MATRIMONIAL REGIMES, supra note 1, at 58–63; Haggar, supra note
71, at 1245.
117. See Rao v. Rao, 927 So. 2d 356, 365–66 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2005).
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826 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
interest in the corporation.118 In the creation of the medical corporation,
the husband and wife both signed a Stockholder Agreement.119 The 
Stockholder Agreement stated that if any stockholder resigned, died, or 
was otherwise terminated from the corporation, the stockholder agreed to
sell his interest back to the corporation for a price of $25,000.120 The
Stockholder Agreement further stated that if any of the stockholders’ 
spouses acquired an interest in the corporation due to community property
law or any other form of joint ownership and if the stockholder and his
spouse divorced, the non-stockholder spouse agreed to sell her interest in
the corporation to the stockholder spouse.121 In the case of divorce, the
Stockholder Agreement provided that the price the non-stockholder
spouse would sell her interest to the stockholder spouse was to be the same
as the amount the stockholder spouse would receive if he had to sell back 
his interest to the corporation.122 Thus, a divorcing non-stockholder spouse
was contractually obligated to sell her interest in the corporation to the 
stockholder spouse for $25,000, or if she held only a one-half interest as 
would be the case under Louisiana’s community property law, then for 
$12,500.123 
Within a year of the husband and wife signing the Stockholder
Agreement, the wife filed for, and was granted, divorce.124 During the
partition of community property, the husband and wife disputed the value 
of the community’s interest in the medical corporation.125 The wife’s
expert, using a capitalization of cash flow method to value the
community’s interest, found that the value of the community’s one-sixth 
interest in the medical corporation was between $741,000 and 
$1,349,000.126 In utilizing the capitalization of cash flow method, the
wife’s expert acknowledged that goodwill was represented in his
calculation.127 
118. Id. at 358.
119. Id. at 359. The wife disputed whether she was able to see the entire
agreement or only the page on which she signed. Id.
120. Id. at 362.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. Under Louisiana Civil Code article 2336, each spouse has a one-half
interest in any community property; thus, upon divorce, the non-shareholder 
spouse would have only a one-half interest in the shareholder spouse’s interest. 
124. Rao, 927 So. 2d at 359.
125. Id. at 364–65.
126. Id. at 365.
127. Id.
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8272020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
The husband’s experts disputed the applicability of the method used
by the wife’s expert, instead asserting that the value of the community’s
interest was only the buy-sell amount stated in the Stockholder 
Agreement.128 One expert for the husband, a certified public accountant,
testified that he actually viewed the value of the husband’s interest to be
only $2,000, which was the amount the husband actually paid to acquire 
the stock in the corporation.129 In his testimony, the accountant
acknowledged that the $25,000 used in the Stockholder Agreement was 
“‘arbitrary’ and bore no relation to the ‘profitability’ of the 
corporation.”130 
The husband’s other expert, a lawyer with a concentration in the health
care industry who prepared the Stockholder Agreement for the medical
corporation, similarly testified that the value of the community’s interest
was contractually limited to $25,000.131 In his testimony, the attorney 
stated that the inclusion of a valuation in the Stockholder Agreement was 
a regular practice for medical groups and served to financially protect “the
corporation’s ongoing business in the event of the departure of a 
stockholder physician.”132 
The Rao court, siding with the husband’s experts, found that the
Stockholder Agreement established a stipulated, binding value for the
interest of the community.133 In doing so, the court stated: “A stock 
transfer agreement which is unambiguous, clearly sets forth its terms, and
is executed by capable parties is enforceable. The sell/buy provisions . . . 
were valid and binding stock transfer restrictions, and clearly governed the 
valuation of the stock.”134 
The court’s conclusion that the buy-sell amount automatically
established the fair market value of the community’s interest in the
corporation was based in part on a rejection of the wife’s expert’s use of 
goodwill.135 Citing the newly enacted goodwill statute, the Rao court
stated that “[t]he evidence clearly supports the conclusion that the 
hypothetical value postulated by [the wife’s] expert accountant was largely
based upon goodwill attributable to the personal qualities and patient
relationships of [the husband] and his fellow stockholder physicians . . . .”136 
128. Id. at 364–65.
129. Id. at 365. 
130. Id. at 364.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 366. 
134. Id. at 366–67.
135. Id. at 365.
136. Id.
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828 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
The Rao court then concluded that any goodwill attributable to the husband
or any other physicians with an interest in the medical corporation should
not be incorporated into its valuation.137 
Building on the decision in Rao, the Third Circuit in Baumbouree v. 
Baumbouree similarly held that a Shareholder Agreement that stipulated a 
purchase price for the shares in a medical corporation acquired by the
community established the value of the community’s interest in the 
corporation for purposes of partitioning community property.138 In
Baumbouree, the husband, a pediatrician, purchased one share of stock in 
a medical corporation consisting of other physicians.139 In purchasing the
stock, the husband signed a Shareholder Agreement, but the wife refused
to sign the agreement.140 The Shareholder Agreement provided that the
purchase price for each share of stock was $1,000.141 The Shareholder
Agreement further stated that the medical corporation would purchase a
member’s share in the event of the death of the shareholder, the 
suspension, revocation, or cancellation of the member’s right to practice
medicine in Louisiana, any restriction or limitation to the member 
practicing medicine, or the termination of the member’s employment with 
the corporation.142 
Upon the divorce of the husband and wife, the wife’s expert testified
that the function of a stated purchase price like that in the Shareholder 
Agreement was “to penalize the member/shareholder upon exiting the
practice.”143 The wife’s expert further stated that “two distinct intangible 
assets, goodwill and going concern value” had to be determined, and that 
“the subjective and static stated value contained in the shareholder 
agreement excludes all of the necessary elements which must be
considered in quantifying either the fair market value or the fair value of 
the community property.”144 The husband, in contrast, argued that the
Shareholder Agreement was binding on the community and provided the 
137. Id. at 366.
138. Baumbouree v. Baumbouree, 202 So. 3d 1077, 1082–84 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2016). 
139. Id. at 1078.
140. Id. At the time the husband signed the agreement and tried to get his wife 
to sign it, the spouses were physically separated and contemplating divorce. Id. at 
1080. The wife stated that the husband “told her that the purpose of the document 
was to protect the company, that it would not affect her, and that it had nothing to 
do with their divorce.” Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1080.
144. Id. (quotations omitted). 
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2020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES 829
value of the community’s share in the medical corporation, namely,
$1,000.145 
The Baumbouree court agreed with the husband, finding that the facts 
were indistinguishable from Rao.146 In doing so, the Third Circuit stated 
that it would be “irrelevant” and “inappropriate” to incorporate the
goodwill or going concern value of the medical corporation or any
physician in the group.147 Citing Rao, the Baumbouree court noted that
“the valuation of the stock in a ‘close corporation,’ such as a medical 
practice, . . . has the purpose of effecting ‘an orderly transfer of ownership’
should one of the physician shareholders have to leave the practice.”148 
The court reasoned that because the husband would only be paid $1,000 if
he left the practice due to any of the reasons provided in the Shareholder 
Agreement, the community’s interest in the medical corporation was 
$1,000.149 
In his dissent in Baumbouree, Judge Saunders found that the 
Shareholder Agreement only purported to assign a value to the stock in the 
limited instances in which the husband had to transfer the interest back to
the medical corporation, and those instances did not include divorce.150 
Further, Judge Saunders argued that although the Shareholder Agreement
stated a value for the stock, ownership of the stock inured to the husband 
a multitude of benefits, thus making its value to the husband and, in turn,
the community, greater than the amount stated in the Shareholder
Agreement.151 To support his conclusion, Judge Saunders cited earlier
decisions, such as the aforementioned cases of Borrello and Fastabend.152 
With both Rao and Baumbouree decided, it was not long before other
courts followed suit. In the aforementioned 2017 case Bulloch v. Bulloch, 
a husband–physician acquired an interest during the marriage in
145. Id. at 1079–80.
146. Id. at 1083. The court found it irrelevant that, unlike in Rao, the wife in
Baumbouree did not sign the Shareholder Agreement because the husband had 
the exclusive right to manage the community’s stock interest in the medical
corporation. Id. at 1084. Judge Saunders, in his dissent in Baumbouree, agreed 
with the majority that the husband had exclusive authority to manage the stock. 
Id. at 1085 (Saunders, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1084.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1085 (Saunders, J., dissenting); see also David M. Prados, Family 
Law, 64 LA. B.J. 453, 453 (2017).
151. Baumbouree, at 1085–86 (Saunders, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 1086 (Saunders, J., dissenting); see also supra Part I (discussion of
Borrello and Fastabend).
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830 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Orthopedic Clinic Enterprises where the husband was an affiliated 
physician.153 The Shareholder Agreement signed by the husband, but not
by the wife, stated that in the event of the divorce of one of the members, 
the member–spouse had the “obligation to purchase all of the interest of
his spouse in the shares of [Orthopedic Clinic Enterprises] for a price 
determined according to this Agreement.”154 The Shareholder Agreement 
further stated that “the terms of this Agreement are binding upon the 
interests and rights of the spouse of any shareholder.”155 Finally, the
Shareholder Agreement established a formula for calculating the buy-sell
amount that any shareholder was owed upon leaving Orthopedic Clinic
Enterprises.156 Just as experts in the previous cases noted, the husband
attested that “[t]he Shareholder Agreement and Buy-Sell Agreements were 
designed for valid business reasons to control the transfers and amounts in 
order to protect business interests and provide for orderly buy-ins and buy-
outs.”157 
Applying the formula stated in the Shareholder’s Agreement put the 
husband’s interest in Orthopedic Clinic Enterprises at $19,500.158 The 
wife’s expert valued the community’s interest in Orthopedic Clinic 
Enterprises at $1,960,530.159 Following the decisions of Rao and 
Baumbouree, the Bulloch court easily held that the Shareholder
Agreement signed by the husband–physician, but not by the wife,
established the value of the husband’s interest in Orthopedic Clinic
Enterprises.160 
The outcome of Bulloch is not surprising given the results in Rao and 
Baumbouree, but the case is noteworthy for showing how financially
valuable a Shareholder Agreement can be for the member–spouse during
a divorce. In addition to acquiring an interest in Orthopedic Clinic 
Enterprises while married, the husband–physician in Bulloch similarly
153. Bulloch v. Bulloch, 214 So. 3d 930, 935 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017);
Original Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff/Appellant, Lydia Clare Bulloch, at 17,
Bulloch, 214 So. 3d 930 (No. 13-2820-3).
154. Original Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff/Appellant, Lydia Clare Bulloch, at
19, Bulloch, 214 So. 3d 930 (No. 13-2820-3).
155. Id. at 18.
156. Written Reasons for Judgment Regarding Partition of Community
Property, at 7–8, Bulloch, 214 So. 3d 930 (No. 13-2820-3); Original Brief Filed 
by Defendant-Appellee, at 12, Bulloch, 214 So. 3d 930 (No. 13-2820-3).
157. Original Brief Filed by Defendant-Appellee, at 12, Bulloch, 214 So. 3d
930 (No. 13-2820-3).
158. Bulloch, 214 So. 3d 930, 939.
159. Id. at 939.
160. Id. at 940–41.
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8312020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
acquired an interest in a medical limited liability company, the Advanced
Surgery Center, while married.161 Ownership in the Advanced Surgery 
Center and Orthopedic Clinic Enterprises substantially overlapped,162 
though the documents creating the interests in the two entities were
different. The operating agreement that controlled the physicians’ interests
for the Advanced Surgery Center established a value at which the Center
would purchase back a physician’s interest if he disassociated from the 
Center, but the operating agreement did not include divorce or community 
property partition as a disassociation event.163 Accordingly, the Bulloch
court found that the operating agreement for the Advanced Surgery Center
did not apply to the valuation of the husband’s interest in the Center for
purposes of partitioning the community property.164 Instead, the court
relied on the experts of the husband and wife, both of which used an 
income method to value the husband’s interest in the Center.165 In
determining which expert to follow, the court was faced with the
previously discussed issue of how to subtract goodwill attributable to the 
personal qualities of the husband from the overall valuation.166 But the
ultimate outcome highlights just how valuable a Shareholder Agreement
can be if courts continue to follow Rao, Baumbouree, and Bulloch—the
community’s interest in the Advanced Surgery Center that did not have a 
controlling agreement was $663,112,167 whereas the community’s interest
in Orthopedic Clinic Enterprises that did have a controlling agreement was 
$19,500.168 
IV. UNRAVELING THE WRONGNESS OF RAO
Rao, Baumbouree, and Bulloch have created a trilogy of decisions that 
rely on faulty logic and defy how a community’s interest in a business
must be valued based on the statutory requirements of Louisiana’s
161. Id. at 935. The husband acquired a 5.1% interest in the Advanced Surgery
Center. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 936; Written Reasons for Judgment Regarding Partition of 
Community Property, at 10–11, Bulloch, 214 So. 3d 930 (No. 13-2820-3).
164. Bulloch, 214 So. 3d 9 at 936. 
165. Id.
166. Id. at 937–39; supra Part III (discussing how the Bulloch court
determined that goodwill was attributable to the husband–physician’s personal
qualities).
167. Id. at 939.
168. Id. at 940.
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832 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
partition statute.169 Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2801 establishes that
the value of a community asset for purposes of partition is the “fair market 
value” of the asset at the time of trial.170 Based on the plain text of the
statute, courts have an obligation to determine the “fair market value” of 
any community asset to partition the community property.
Rao and its progeny incorrectly equate the stated buy-sell amount in
an agreement with the fair market value of the member’s interest in the
business. Certainly, it is an accurate statement that businesses, like medical
corporations or law partnerships, can and should provide a buy-sell 
amount in the paperwork establishing the entity.171 Establishing such an 
amount is “crucially important to resolve the question of price definitively
in advance, leaving nothing to negotiation at the time of the actual transfer,
when extrinsic factors (such as a breakdown in relationships) may make it
difficult or impossible to achieve consensus.”172 
The reality, however, is that buy-sell amounts are not inherently the 
fair market value of the business.173 As discussed by Professors Glenn 
Morris and Wendell Holmes in their treatise on business organizations in
Louisiana, buy-sell amounts serve different purposes, and the amounts an 
entity establishes should reflect the purpose the entity wants those amounts 
to serve. As the scholars state:
It is, however, probably fair to say that the price issue is rarely 
given the degree of serious consideration it deserves. Indeed, in 
many circumstances it appears that drafters are unaware that there 
are different functions which these agreements may serve, and that 
these functions should have some bearing on the way that the price 
for shares is set. For example, if control over participation is the 
169. See LOUISIANA DIVORCE, supra note 1, at 78–79.
170. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2801(A)(1)(a), (A)(4)(a) (2018).
171. See GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 29.1, in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 727 (2d ed. 2017)
[hereinafter BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS]. Rao, Baumbouree, and Bulloch all make
the unequivocally current point that such agreements are not contrary to public 
policy. See Rao v. Rao, 927 So. 2d 356, 366 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2005);
Baumbouree v. Baumbouree, 202 So. 3d 1077, 1083 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2016); 
Original Brief Filed by Defendant-Appellee, at 12, Bulloch, 214 So. 3d 930 (No.
13-2820-3). That the agreements are not contrary to public policy, however, does
not automatically lead to the proposition that the agreements are in fact
representative of the fair market value of the business.
172. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 171, at 742.
173. A buy-sell amount need not represent the fair market value of the business
at the time the business is created, see BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 171, 
at 743–45, much less the fair market value of the business at the time of divorce.
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8332020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
primary goal, then the parties may wish to set a price which
deliberately undercompensates a stockholder who wishes to 
dispose of his shares, thereby discouraging his withdrawal. On the
other hand, the primary purpose of the agreement may be to insure 
that each shareholder receives the fair value of his investment. In
this regard, a distinction might also be drawn between voluntary 
and involuntary transfers. A clear understanding of the parties’
actual intent should thus precede the attempt to arrive at a pricing
formula for their agreement.174 
The buy-sell amount in an agreement can serve any legitimate purpose
desired by the entity. The statutory requirement for valuing a community 
property asset, though, is to value the “fair market value” of the asset at
the time of trial.175 To the extent that the buy-sell amount reflects anything
other than the fair market value of the business at the time of the trial of
the divorce, the buy-sell amount should not be automatically equated to
the business’s fair market value.
That the drafters of a shareholder agreement or a partnership
agreement could have alternative motives in setting the buy-sell amount
was not lost on the court in Rao. In Rao, both experts who argued that the
amount stated in the Shareholder Agreement should be used as the fair
market value of the community’s interest testified that the amount was
“arbitrary,” “bore no relations to the ‘profitability’ of the corporation,” and
served to financially protect “the corporation’s ongoing business in the 
event of the departure of a stockholder physician.”176 The courts in 
Baumbouree and Bulloch made similar acknowledgements.177 
As all three courts understood that there were legitimate business
reasons that the particular entities set for a particular buy-sell amount, and 
that those amounts were to some extent arbitrary, it is difficult to accept 
that the courts viewed the buy-sell amount as the actual fair market value 
of the community’s interest. More plausibly, it appears that the underlying 
rationale on which the courts rested was the notion that if the member– 
spouse left the business, he would receive only the stated buy-sell amount. 
The Baumbouree court highlighted this rationale expressly when it stated
that “we note that if [the husband] is forced to sell his one share of . . . 
174. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 171, at 742–43.
175. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2801(A)(1)(a).
176. Rao v. Rao, 927 So. 2d 356, 364 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2016).
177. Baumbouree v. Baumbouree, 202 So. 3d 1077, 1080 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 
2016); Original Brief Filed by Defendant-Appellee, at 12, Bulloch v. Bulloch, 214 
So. 3d 930 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017) (No. 13-2820-3).
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834 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
stock back to the corporation upon the occurrence of any of the triggering 
events . . . he will only be paid $1,000.00 as fixed in that agreement.”178 
Baumbouree is correct in its conclusion that if the husband left the
medical corporation, he would receive only the buy-sell amount provided
for in the agreement. The logic of automatically applying that amount as
the fair market value of the community’s interest in the corporation is
flawed, however, for multiple reasons. 
First, although the individual member–spouse would receive only the
buy-sell amount if he exited the business, that does not mean the business, 
as an entity, would be sold for only the buy-sell amount. Louisiana courts
have repeatedly defined fair market value as meaning the price a willing 
buyer will pay a willing seller on the open market.179 The fair market value
for the business, be it a law partnership or a medical corporation, is the 
amount for which the business would be sold on the open market. The
value of the community’s interest in the business is then the community’s 
share of what the overall business would be sold for on the open market.180 
The amount the business would be sold for on the open market may have 
no relation to the buy-sell amount established in a shareholder 
agreement.181 
That the buy-sell amount is not inherently equal to the fair market
value of the business is apparent from a simple example with law 
partnerships. A law partnership of three individuals might limit how much
any individual partner can receive upon departing the firm to $1,000 to 
make it financially disadvantageous for a partner to leave. If the three-
person law firm is purchased by a larger law firm, the price that the larger
law firm pays the three-person partnership is not limited to the aggregate
buy-sell amount from the three partners’ agreement of $3,000. In such a 
situation, assuming the three partners shared equally in the profits of their
178. Baumbouree, 202 So. 3d at 1084.
179. See Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Hill, 788 So. 2d 1154, 1160 (La. 2001)
(defining fair market value for purposes of expropriation); Dep’t of Highways v. 
Tolmas, 113 So. 2d 288, 290 (La. 1959) (same); Shopf v. Marina Del Ray 
Partnership, 549 So. 2d 833, 839 (La. 1989) (defining fair market value for
purposes of a partner withdrawing from a partnership); Thomson v. Thomson, 978 
So. 2d 509, 514–15 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008) (applying the fair market value
definition from Shopf to the community property partition statute).
180. E.g., Fancher v. Prudhome, 112 So. 3d 909, 912 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
2013) (affirming the trial court taking the value of an LLC, then multiplying the
overall LLC’s value by one-third, the amount of the withdrawing member’s
interest). 
181. See Brett R. Turner, Theories and Methods for Valuing Marital Assets,
52 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1, 33–34 (2012).
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8352020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
original partnership, the three partners would equally share in whatever
amount the larger law firm paid to purchase their partnership. 
The second logical flaw in assigning a business only the buy-sell 
amount—because that is the amount the member–spouse would receive if
he departed the business—is that none of the courts mentioned any
evidence that the member–spouse was actually leaving the business.
Louisiana courts have generally rejected taking hypothetical or speculative
facts into account when valuing the community’s interest in a business.182 
If the member of a business with a Shareholder Agreement is in fact
leaving the entity simultaneously to his divorce, that certainly could 
impact the fair market value of the member’s interest in the business,183 
but such facts were never presented in the cases of Rao, Baumbouree, or
Bulloch. 
Third, given that Rao and Baumbouree discussed goodwill and the 
goodwill statute enacted after Ellington,184 it appears that the courts
erroneously extended the logic that the member–spouse would only 
receive the buy-sell amount if he exited the business one step further. In 
doing so, the courts assumed that because the member–spouse would
receive only the buy-sell amount upon exiting, then any value of the 
business over and above the buy-sell amount must be attributable to the
future value of the business, or what might otherwise be referred to as
182. See, e.g., Head v. Head, 714 So. 2d 231, 238 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1998);
McGehee v. McGehee, 543 So. 2d 1126, 1128–29 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1989); 
Segura v. Comeaux, 279 So. 3d 418, 421 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2017); Nesbitt v.
Nesbitt, 15 So. 3d 1229, 1232 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2009); see also supra Part I
(discussing Louisiana cases in which courts have refused to take speculative facts 
into account). Other jurisdictions have rejected speculative facts when valuing at
divorce the marital estate’s interest in a business created during marriage. E.g.,
Bowen v. Bowen, 473 A.2d 73, 79 (N.J. 1984); Cole v. Cole, 110 S.W.3d 310, 
315–16 (Ark. App. Ct. 2003).
183. It is worth noting that although the fair market value of a member’s
interest in a business could be impacted if the member in fact departed the
business simultaneously to his divorce, a spouse cannot fraudulently depart a 
business in an effort to decrease the value of the community property subject to 
partition. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2354 (2018) (“A spouse is liable for any loss or 
damage caused by fraud or bad faith in the management of the community 
property.”); Thigpen v. Thigpen, 91 So. 2d 12, 20 (La. 1956), overruled on other
grounds, Fowler v. Fowler, 861 So. 2d 181 (La. 2003); MATRIMONIAL REGIMES,
supra note 1, at 482–93.
184. Rao v. Rao, 927 So. 2d 356, 365–66 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2005); 
Baumbouree v. Baumbouree, 202 So. 3d 1077, 1082–83 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2016).
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836 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
goodwill.185 Although there may be mathematical ease in making such an 
assumption, it is simply incorrect. The valuation of a business is based on 
a series of assets, goodwill being but one. Goodwill might account for 
some of the value of the business over the stated buy-sell amount, but 
goodwill does not inherently account for all of the excess value. 
A simple example showcases the logical flaw in assuming that any 
amount in excess of the buy-sell amount is attributable to goodwill. Before
being purchased by the larger law firm, the small three-person law
partnership acquires an office building valued at $250,000. The firm then
purchases computers, desks, tables, and other movable assets necessary to
operate a law firm. The value of the movable and immovable assets of the
partnership is $350,000. Recall, the partnership agreement sets the buy-
sell amount for each partner’s shares at $1,000. It is obvious that the value 
of the law partnership is not $3,000. At a minimum, the value of the 
partnership is $350,000, which is the value of the physical assets held by
the partnership. It would be incorrect to find that all of the value above
$3,000 is attributable to the goodwill of the partnership. 
Finally, Rao, Baumbouree, and Bulloch focus on the fact that the 
member–spouse has the legal authority to manage the community’s 
interest in the business.186 The courts are correct that the spouse in whose
name stock is issued has the exclusive right to manage the stock,187 and
the spouse who is a member of a partnership or a limited liability company 
has the exclusive right to manage that interest.188 In exercising his
exclusive managerial authority, the member–spouse can bind the
community with respect to third parties.189 Thus, if the managing spouse
exited the business while married, the community would certainly be 
bound to receive only the buy-sell amount to which the managing spouse
contractually agreed. Such a result would be a legitimate exercise of the 
managing spouse’s sole managerial authority.
What a spouse with sole managerial authority cannot do, however, is 
use his sole managerial authority to contractually bind the spouses vis-à-
vis one another. Under basic contract law, parties may create obligations
between themselves, but those contractual obligations bind the parties to
185. This rationale was expressly adopted by a Texas court in R.V.K. v. L.L.K.,
103 S.W.3d 612, 619 (Tex. App. Ct. 2003).
186. Bulloch v. Bulloch, 214 So. 3d 930, 940–41 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017);
Rao, 927 So. 2d 356, 366–67; Baumbouree, 202 So. 3d 1077, 1083.
187. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2351.
188. Id. art. 2352.
189. See MATRIMONIAL REGIMES, supra note 1, at 397–99.
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8372020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
the contract, not third parties.190 This principle is easily recognizable in the
sale of a house. If a seller enters into a contract with a buyer to sell a house 
for $300,000, the parties to the contract are bound by that agreement. The 
tax assessor, however, is not bound by the contract between the buyer and 
seller.191 If the reasonable market value of the house is actually $350,000,
the tax assessor will assess taxes based on the amount of $350,000, not the 
price contracted for by the buyer and seller.
The same house example applies in the community context as well. If 
a wife, while married, purchased a house for $300,000, the house would 
be a community asset as it was acquired during marriage.192 If the spouses
file for divorce on the following day, then the house would be included in
the partition of the community. If the fair market value of the house was 
actually $350,000 instead of the $300,000 that the wife paid, the husband 
would not be bound to value the house for purposes of the partition at only
$300,000.193 The community would be bound to pay the seller only 
$300,000 for the house, but as between the spouses, the contract would not
be binding with regard to its value for purposes of partition.194 
Businesses, although perhaps more complicated to value than houses,
operate just like the house example. A spouse, exercising his managerial 
authority, can contractually obligate the community to receive a certain
amount should the member–spouse exit the business while married. That 
190. Obligations in Louisiana law establish a legal relationship between the
obligor and obligee only. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1756; see also MATRIMONIAL
REGIMES, supra note 1, at 397 (noting that under the basic principles of 
obligations, “in absence of an intent to benefit a third person, only the persons
who are party to a contract are affected by it”).
191. E.g., Park Esplanade Ltd. Partnership v. Williams, 577 So. 2d 1028 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (finding that the actual value of a house, and thus the
amount on which taxes should be assessed, was lower than the purchase price).
192. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2338.
193. See generally MATRIMONIAL REGIMES, supra note 1, at 761–65 
(discussing that the actual value of the asset must be determined for purposes of
partition).
194. The absurdity of applying the purchase price as the de facto value of a
house for community property partition purposes is highlighted by the practice in 
some real estate markets in Louisiana of listing a trifling amount as the purchase
price. See Kate Moran, Buyers, Sellers Can Conceal Real Value of Property in 
Transaction Records, TIMES-PICAYUNE (2009). If the stated purchase price for a
$1,000,000 house is “$10 and other valuable consideration,” certainly upon 
divorce the spouses are not bound to value the house at only $10. 
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838 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
contractual obligation, however, cannot bind the spouses vis-à-vis each
other as to the value of the community’s interest in the business.195 
V. GETTING BACK TO THE GOOD: HOW COURTS SHOULD VALUE THE 
COMMUNITY’S INTEREST IN A BUSINESS
Valuing a community property business is unquestionably difficult
and, as many Louisiana courts have noted, not an exact science.196 The
Rao court was correct to note that “[g]iven the dynamics of businesses and
business practices, and factoring in circumstances that may be unique to 
the parties, an inflexible formula for determining business value would be
impractical.”197 The irony of Rao, then, is that courts have interpreted the
Rao decision as creating an inflexible formula to determine business value,
namely that the buy-sell amount is the de facto business value.
Prior to Rao, courts recognized that they did not have to accept at face 
value a party’s claim of the valuation of an asset,198 and at a minimum,
courts should return to that practice. Undoubtedly, any buy-sell amount 
included in a partnership or shareholder agreement may be considered in
195. To allow one spouse to use his exclusive managerial authority to bind the
other spouse as to the value of community property would be permitting the 
managing spouse to unilaterally execute matrimonial agreements, which law
clearly does not permit. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2329, 2331. Even if the law did
permit one spouse to unilaterally execute a matrimonial agreement, none of the
agreements in the Rao line of cases complied with the form requirements of a post
nuptial agreement. Id. Louisiana courts have made clear that the form 
requirements of a postnuptial matrimonial agreement must be strictly construed. 
E.g., Acurio v. Acurio, 224 So. 3d 935 (La. 2017). This is not to say that spouses 
could not bind themselves as to the value of the community’s interest in a 
business. Certainly, spouses could execute a matrimonial agreement that assigned 
the value of the community’s interest in any particular business. See LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2330 (delineating the limited items spouses may not alter via 
matrimonial agreement).
196. E.g., Landry v. Simon, 732 So. 2d 587, 589 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1999);
Ellington v. Ellington, 842 So. 2d 1160, 1166 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2003); Head 
v. Head, 714 So. 2d 231, 232 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1998).
197. Rao v. Rao, 927 So. 2d 356, 365 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2005); see also
Head, 714 So. 2d at 234 (“Given the dynamics of businesses and business
practices, factoring in circumstances that may be unique to the parties, an 
inflexible formula for determining value is said to be impractical.”).
198. See McDonald v. McDonald, 909 So. 2d 694, 698 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
2005); Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1166; Alford v. Alford, 653 So. 2d 133, 136 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1995).
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8392020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
the court’s analysis, but such an amount should not be taken at face value
as the fair market value.199 
In valuing the community’s interest in a business, courts need not
restrict themselves to only reviewing how businesses are valued in other 
divorce cases; businesses are regularly valued in other areas of the law,
particularly for tax purposes in the area of estate planning.200 The method
by which courts value businesses in this context can prove informative for
courts handling a community property partition.
Just as the community property partition statute in Louisiana requires
courts to determine the fair market value of each community property
asset,201 the fair market value of any asset, including business interests,
must be determined for the purposes of calculating any estate taxes
owed.202 In such context, courts interpret fair market value as meaning the
value at which a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to exchange 
the property.203 Just as courts have recognized in valuing businesses for a
community property partition, courts recognize that valuations for tax
purposes are not an exact science.204 
199. This is the majority view in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Money v. 
Money, 852 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Alaska 1993); Barton v. Barton, 639 S.E.2d 481,
482 (Ga. 2007); Bailey v. Bailey, 954 P.2d 962, 966 (Wyo. 1998); Cole v. Cole,
110 S.W.3d 310, 314 (Ark. App. Ct. 2003); Bosserman v. Bosserman, 384 S.E.2d 
104, 108 (Va. 1989); Bowen v. Bowen, 473 A.2d 73, 79 (N.J. 1984); In re
Marriage of Huff, 834 P.2d 244, 256–57 (Colo. 1992); Drake v. Drake, 809 
S.W.2d 710, 713 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); Colclasure v. Colclasure, 295 P.3d 1123, 
1129 (Okla. 2012); Burns v. Burns, 643 N.E.2d 80, 83 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1994); Von 
Hohn v. Von Hohn, 260 S.W.3d 631, 640 (Tex. App. 2008); Butler v. Butler, 663 
A.2d 148, 154 (Penn. 1995); Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah 1984);
Lyon v. Lyon, 439 N.W.2d 18, 20 (Minn. 1989); JOHN ELDER, HANDBOOK OF
TEXAS FAMILY LAW § 10:2, in 33 TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES (2018) (noting that 
“[t]he correct value to be established is fair market value . . . . Other sums, such 
as the purchase price, or replacement cost are usually not relevant.”).
200. Neil H. Weinberg, Valuation Adjustments to Transfers of Family, 28 EST.
PLN. 268, *2 (2001). See generally Edwin T. Hood, John J. Mylan, & Timothy P. 
O’Sullivan, Valuation of Closely Held Business Interests, 65 UMKC L. REV. 339 
(1997) (detailing the different manners in which a closely held business may be
valued).
201. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2801(A)(1)(a) (2018).
202. This is less relevant today given the high level of the estate tax, but it was
a consideration previously.
203. E.g., U.S. v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550–51 (1973); Estate of Andrews
v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 79 T.C. 938, 954 (1982).
204. E.g., Messing v. C.I.R., 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967).
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840 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
To aid in determining the fair market value of closely held 
corporations where comparable market equivalents are lacking, the 
Internal Revenue Service Ruling 59-60 provides a non-exclusive list of
factors to consider.205 The factors include: (1) the nature and history of the
business; (2) the economic outlook for the business; (3) the book value of
the business’s stock and the current financial condition of the business;
(4) the business’s earning capacity; (5) the business’s dividend-paying 
capacity; (6) any intangible assets of the business, such as goodwill; (7) the 
sales of stock of the business; and (8) the market price of stock of similar
businesses.206 These factors have become widely accepted as good
practices for valuing closely held businesses.207 
To the extent these factors are applicable for the particular business in 
question, courts—and lawyers—would be wise to at least consider the
factors as courts have done in tax cases. In doing so, though, courts and
lawyers must recognize that not all of the factors will be pertinent in every
case. For example, rule 59-60 examines the goodwill of the business in
determining its value.208 To the extent that the goodwill of a business is
attributable to the personal qualities of the spouse to be awarded the
business, Louisiana courts are prohibited by statute from factoring it into 
the overall business valuation.209 
Tax cases also provide a good example on how courts can recognize 
actual facts that may impact a business’s valuation, as opposed to
speculative facts.210 For example, if an entity is on the brink of dissolution,
courts are more likely to find the book value of the company to be its fair 
205. Rev. Rul. 59-60.
206. Rev. Rul. 59-60; see also Moody v. Moody, 622 So. 2d 1381, 1384
(although the court did not follow the factors from ruling 59-60, one expert noted 
that the ruling provided accepted factors in calculating fair market value). 
207. See James L. Rigelhaupt, Valuation of Stock of Closely Held Corporations,
2 AM. JUR. POF. 1, § 3 (2019).
208. Rev. Rul. 59-60.
209. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2801.2 (2018); supra Part II (discussing goodwill 
under Louisiana law).
210. See Snyder’s Estate v. U.S., 285 F.2d 857, 861 (4th Cir. 1961) (“Closely 
held corporate stock cannot be valued reasonably by the application of any 
inflexible formula. One tailored to the particular case must be found, and that can 
be done only after a discriminating consideration of all information . . . .”).
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8412020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
market value,211 whereas if a company will continue in operation, the book
value is less indicative of the entity’s fair market value.212 
In addition to obtaining guidance from tax cases, other jurisdictions 
may also give guidance in calculating the fair market value of a business
at divorce. Texas, a community property state, serves as a good 
comparison because Texas courts must similarly determine the fair market 
value of community assets to divide those assets upon divorce.213 
Moreover, in the valuation of a community property business, Texas 
jurisprudence similarly excludes goodwill attributable to the personal 
abilities of one spouse214 but includes other goodwill not attributable to the
personal qualities of a spouse.215 
In examining the issue of whether a partnership agreement controls 
the value of the community’s interest in the partnership, Texas courts have
held that such partnership agreements do not automatically control the 
value of the community’s interest in the partnership.216 In Von Hohn v.
Von Hohn, the husband was a partner in a law firm, and the law firm had
a partnership agreement that included a specified amount the partner 
would be paid if he withdrew from the firm.217 The husband testified that
he had no plans to withdraw from the partnership.218 The Von Hohn court 
211. E.g., Estate of Sobel v. Comm’r, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 613 (T.C. 1951)
(using the book value as fair market value for a business that was likely to dissolve 
due to the death of a member who was the key factor in the business’s success).
212. See, e.g., Rothgery v. U.S., 475 F.2d 591, 594 (Claims Ct. 1973) (using 
an asset valuation for an automobile dealer because that type of valuation was the
industry norm); Estate of Thalheimer, 33 T.C.M. 87 (1974) (finding that if a
company acts more like an investment company than an operating company, the 
company’s valuation should be primarily based on the underlying net asset
valuation of the company’s shares).
213. See R.V.K. v. L.L.K., 103 S.W.3d 612, 618 (Tex. App. Ct. 2003) (citing 
Walston v. Walston, 971 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex. App. Ct. 1998)). Unlike in
Louisiana, however, Texas does not mandate that community property be divided
equally upon divorce. See Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698–99 (Tex. 1981); 
Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1974).
214. See Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 763–64 (Tex. 1972); Hirsch v. Hirsch, 
770 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. App. Ct. 1989); Keith v. Keith, 763 S.W.2d 950, 952 
(Tex. App. Ct. 1989).
215. E.g., Finch v. Finch, 825 S.W.2d 218, 224–25 (Tex. App. Ct. 1992);
Rathmell v. Morrison, 732 S.W.2d 6, 18 (Tex. App. Ct. 1987); Geesbreght v. 
Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427, 436 (Tex. App. Ct. 1978).
216. See, e.g., Von Hohn v. Von Hohn, 260 S.W.3d 631, 640 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2008); Keith v. Keith, 763 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. App. Ct. 1989).
217. Von Hohn, 260 S.W.3d at 640. 
218. Id.
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842 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
found that the withdrawal amount provided for in the partnership
agreement had no bearing on the community’s interest in the partnership 
because the withdrawal amount did not represent the actual value of the 
community’s interest based on the actual facts and circumstances of the 
spouses at the time of divorce.219 
In reaching a value for the community’s interest in the husband’s law
partnership, the Von Hohn court also provided an insightful discussion of
what courts in Texas can and cannot consider. The court made clear that
the valuation of the law partnership was to be based on its value at the time
of divorce; future profits generated by future efforts of the husband were 
not to be considered because those profits would be generated after the
divorce and thus would not be part of the community.220 The court also 
recognized in valuing the law partnership, however, that income of the
firm attributable to labor that occurred during the marriage must be 
included in the partnership valuation, even if that income had yet to be 
collected.221 
In the more recent case of Mandell v. Mandell, the Texas appellate
court found that the shareholder agreement’s buy-sell amount did control
the value of the community’s interest in the husband’s medical
association,222 but the court gave a number of important caveats in its
holding. The Mandell court distinguished Von Hohn on the basis that the 
partnership agreement in Von Hohn did not include divorce as an event
that triggered the application of the withdrawal amount, whereas the
shareholder agreement in Mandell expressly named divorce as a triggering 
event.223 
More importantly, the Mandell court provided guidance for what the 
wife failed to prove at trial:
[The wife’s] offer of proof likewise did not include evidence that 
the actual value of the stock to [the husband] was greater than the 
$11,000 “buy/sell” price by showing that by virtue of ownership
of the closely held stock, he obtained benefits such as driving a
new automobile, having health insurance paid for by the company, 
having a company-financed life insurance policy, belonging to a
219. Id.
220. Id. at 641.
221. Id.
222. Mandell v. Mandell, 310 S.W.3d 531, 540–41 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).
223. Id. at 540. The reliance on this distinction is similar to the Rao court’s
reliance on the fact that the shareholder agreement included divorce. See Rao v.
Rao, 927 So. 2d 356, 362 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2005). As argued herein, the reliance
on divorce as a triggering event is misplaced in both cases. See supra Part IV.
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8432020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
country club at company expense, or gaining any other similar
financial benefit. Because [the wife’s] offer of proof did not 
include testimony or evidence that might have been relevant to
establish that the value of [the husband’s] shares of stock to him
was greater than the $11,000 value set by the Shareholders
Agreement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing 
to admit the valuation evidence propounded by [the wife].224 
Implicit in the court’s statement is that the wife could have shown that the
fair market value of the community’s interest in the medical association
was greater than the buy-sell amount, but the wife did not put on the 
requisite evidence to do so. In making such a statement, the Mandell court 
recognized that a buy-sell amount may be considered the fair market value
of a business, but it is not automatically assumed to be the fair market
value. The parties may put on evidence to the contrary.
Separate property jurisdictions similarly must value business interests 
at divorce to equitably distribute the marital assets,225 and separate
property jurisdictions similarly battle with topics such as goodwill,226 with 
many jurisdictions jurisprudentially reaching a similar result to
Louisiana.227 Thus, Louisiana courts can also turn to separate property
jurisdictions in considering how to approach fair market valuations of 
businesses. 
One recent opinion that may guide judges and lawyers in considering
the types of questions to be asked when valuing a business for purposes of
partitioning community property comes from the Supreme Court of
Kentucky.228 In determining the fair market value of a business created 
during marriage, the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Gaskill v. Robbins
noted the difficulty in its task, but it went on to lay out the following 
common sense guidance:
224. Mandell, 310 S.W.3d at 541.
225. E.g., Sullivan v. Sullivan, 757 S.E.2d 129, 132 (Ga. 2014); Carney v. 
Carney, 167 A.3d 127, 131–32 (Pa. 2017); Bair v. Bair, 214 So. 3d 750, 752–58 
(Fla. Ct. App. 2017). 
226. E.g., May v. May, 589 S.E.2d 536, 541 (W.Va. 2003); Troyer v. Troyer, 
987 N.E.2d 1130, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013); Hess v. Hess, 927 A.2d 391, 395– 
96 (Me. 2007); Nuveen v. Nuveen, 795 N.W.2d 308, 312–13 (N.D. 2011).
227. E.g., Weigel v. Weigel, 24 N.E.3d 1007, 1011 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)
(distinguishing between personal goodwill that is not a marital asset and enterprise
goodwill that is a marital asset); Ahern v. Ahern, 938 A.2d 35, 40 (Me. 2008)
(finding that goodwill attributable to one spouse’s skill and reputation was not a
transferable marital asset); Beasley v. Beasley, 518 A.2d 545, 556 (Pa. 1986).
228. Gaskill v. Robbins, 282 S.W.3d 306, 311–12 (Ky. 2009).
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844 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
[W]hen a business is established during a marriage and is thus
marital property, the trial court is required to fix a value and divide
it between the spouses. To do this, a trial court must hear factual
evidence, which generally will include expert testimony. If a court
is to arrive at a fair market value of a business, often stated as what 
a willing buyer will pay a willing seller, the court must have the
means to answer at least the following questions a willing buyer 
would ask:
1. What can be earned from the business over a reasonable period 
of time? This value must then be reduced to present value, and
includes the concept of transferable goodwill.
2. What is the value of the hard assets? This includes real estate,
equipment, client lists, cash accounts or anything else the business
may own or control.
3. What is the value of the accounts receivable? This has a 
potential discount because all the accounts may not be collectible.
4. What is the value of the training of the personnel who will
remain with the practice, or what is the cost to train new
personnel?
5. What are the liabilities that will remain after the purchase? This 
includes personnel salaries, taxes, debt service, and other costs of
doing business.229 
Although valuing a business can be difficult for judges and lawyers alike,
approaching the valuation from basic questions like those offered in
Gaskill can make the task more manageable. 
229. Id. The questions posed by the court in Gaskill implicitly recognize that
the buy-sell amount in an agreement is not inherently the fair market value of the
business, and these questions also implicitly recognize that simply taking a net
asset valuation of a business will not capture all of the assets of the business. See
OLDHAM, supra note 10, at 271 (“A net asset valuation will undervalue most
business, however, because that approach ignores the value of the business as a
going concern. For this reason most appraisals include an analysis of the earnings
or cash flow of a business.”).
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8452020] VALUING COMMUNITY PROPERTY BUSINESSES
CONCLUSION 
Businesses are ultimately an asset, just like a house or a car, and thus 
must be valued as part of the community upon partition. The valuation of 
a business may be more difficult than that of a house or a car because
comparable businesses can be hard to find and a business’s assets are
usually comprised of both tangible and intangible items, such as goodwill. 
Although valuing the community’s interest in a business is difficult, it
is doable. The statutory requirement in Louisiana is that courts must take 
the fair market value of the community’s interest at the time of the trial for 
divorce. Buy-sell agreements may represent the fair market value in some
cases, depending on the surrounding circumstances, but they cannot be 
accepted as the de facto fair market value. 
Going forward, courts should return to their practices prior to 
Ellington and the creation of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2801.2
concerning goodwill. Courts should weigh all of the expert testimony, 
consider what the best valuation method for a business is based on the
actual facts surrounding the parties, and to the best of their ability reach a
true fair market value for the community’s interest. In doing so, courts can
achieve the statutorily required equity for both spouses. 
